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OBSTACLES TO BUSINESS TENDENCIES
LEGAL OBSTACLES TO BUSINESS TENDENCIES
By W. F. GEPHART
With the development of representative government, business
has been increasingly subjected in its organization and operation
to statutory direction and control. In the earlier time of kings,
emperors, and despots there was an arbitrary control of busi-
ness, frequently for the benefit of the favorites. This, in the
later days of democratic government, has become a control as-
sumedly in the interests of the public and especially for the bene-
fit of the consumer.
Notwithstanding the frequent complaints that are made
against legislation which attempts to regulate consumption, there
has always been, particularly since the beginning of representa-
tive government, more legislation enacted for the purpose of pro-
tecting the consumer than the producer. Indeed, any legislation
under our democratic forms of government which is of chief
interest and value to the producer immediately incurs the sus-
picion of the public. In an earlier time, when the supply of
goods was limited, laws with respect to engrossing, regrating,
and fair prices, all had for their purpose the protection of the
consumer just as later-day legislation regarding monopolies,
public utility rates, pure food, and numerous other laws have
been for the same purpose.
This discussion concerns itself primarily with the statutory as
distinguished from the common law. Statutory law cannot and
should not be prospective as regarding the changing social order.
Unfortunately enacted law is often too retrospective. A law
should be a rule of social conduct to which the individual mem-
bers of the social group give voluntary and indeed unconscious
obedience. Nor should the courts be continually reading into
the statutory law what is not there. The worst kind of tyranny
is a judicial tyranny. If the changing social order makes the
law obsolete, as is frequently the case, it is for the people, through
their representatives, the legislators, to repeal the law and enact
new legislation in harmony with the spirit of the times. It is
not for the judges of a court to read into and interpret the law
according to what may be their own individual ideas of what
constitutes social justice.
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In order to examine the degree to which statutory law is in
harmony with or opposed to business tendencies, certain ex-
amples may be taken from the general fields of distribution and
production, although equally pertinent cases might be cited from
such specific businesses as banking, insurance, and other industrial
activities. Distribution is for our purpose to be considered as
synonymous with marketing. Production likewise is to be
understood to include the direct activities of man on materials
which result in wealth. The most striking contrast to the stu-
dent of industrial history between production and marketing
-that is, distribution-is the high degree of efficiency and the
rapid advance which has been made in producing goods.
Our system of distribution is yet largely in the ox-cart stage.
Indeed, the progress in production has so far exceeded that in
marketing or distribution that the benefit of the reduced costs in
producing units of goods is largely lost to the consumer because
of the high cost of distribution. It is the field of production
which has attracted for many years the best intellects so that as
compared either with other business activities, such as market-
ing, finance, or even political and social endeavors, the efficiency
of production far outranks all of them. The chief reason for
this is to be found in the fact that production is a more simple
and definite problem as regards its organization or -end. Per-
sonal profit-seeking is the goal which attracts and stimulates
human interest. Individual ability is easily enlisted and di-
rected. Distribution is much more complex and concerns many
more individuals and organizations. Production has had ap-
plied to it much scientific research, the increased use of ma-
chinery, skilled labor, scientific organizations, and efficient meth-
ods not only in the use of material but in the co-ordination of
labor and capital.
But it is only comparatively recently that attention has been
given to methods of marketing and it will probably be many
years, if ever, before our system of distribution is comparable in
its efficiency to the productive organization.
Some of the most marked changes in the field of marketing
have encountered more or less obstruction from statutory laws.
The chain store method of distribution has, for example, called
forth legislation in a number of states in an attempt either to
outlaw the chain store itself or, through license and tax legisla-
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tion, to make its operation much less profitable. Likewise, buy-
ing associations and trade associations have either actually run
afoul of the law or their members have through fear of the law
curtailed their programs in order to avoid the danger of having
their action construed as a restraint of trade. This has been
true because most of the monopoly laws and those in restraint of
trade assumed that any agreement among producers or con-
sumers is for the purpose of controlling price, and therefore,
under the statutory law, might be construed as a restraint of
trade. This is an assumption that is not always true either in
economic theory or in actual fact, since stability in prices may
well redound to an increase in trade and a benefit to consumers
as well as producers, depending upon the character of the com-
modity and the activities of the producing trade or the buying
associations.
Again the question of price maintenance has long been before
the courts of the United States and decisions sometimes of a con-
tradictory character are to be found on this involved question.
So far as the statutory or indeed the common law is concerned
as regards the question of price maintenance, the underlying
principle seems to be that any agreement by manufacturers to
maintain or fix prices at which the distributor may sell an article
is contrary to public policy, since the result is assumed to be a
lessening of competition and, therefore, a restraint of trade.
The manufacturer argues that the chief purpose of a price
maintenance policy is to preserve a market for his product on
which he has expended large sums in advertising for the pur-
pose of acquainting the public with the nierits of the article and
creating confidence in it. If the retailer is not thus controlled
in his resale price he is often tempted to cut the price in order
to stimulate sales and secure a volume of business and thus reduce
his overhead costs. In the meantime, the retailer may, when a
large market is created, endeavor to substitute another article
at a lower price and thus increase his profits. There thus arise
several specific aspects of the price maintenance question.
First there is the primary and legal question whether after a
retailer has purchased the article he is not free to sell it at any
price on the theory that an individual is free to do with his own
as he pleases so long as no public injury is inflicted. On the
other hand, the manufacturer insists that price maintenance
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should be legalized, asserting that the consuming public cannot
discriminate regarding the quality of articles and that when he
has established a large market for the product beneficial not only
to himself but also to the consumer, there is established a right,
if not a vested one, which should not be destroyed by price cut-
ting. There is again what might be termed the consumer view-
point, namely that the consumer should be free to buy when,
where, and what he chooses without restrictions either on the
the part of the manufacturer or influence of the distributor. It
may be stated parenthetically that it does not necessarily fol-
low because the article obtains a market that it is the best pos-
sible article of its kind. Manifestly, a widely consumed product
must have merit to warrant its continued sale, but it need not be
the best possible article. Modern advertising does create mar-
kets. But it does not follow that because of the advertising a
superior article is substituted for an inferior one. Not infre-
quently it is not a case of either superiority or inferiority of the
article sold by advertising, but often simply the substitution of
one article for another.
The pertinent questions, therefore, are, should the law give to
the manufacturer a quasi-monopoly of the market which he has
thus created through advertising, his sales' organization, and in
other ways? Should the government by enacted price main-
tenance legislation thus emphasize the interest of the manu-
facturer or the distributor or the consumer? Or should it con-
fine its activities, so far as marketing products is concerned, to
such legislation as that in the case of pure foods, public utility
rates, anti-monopolistic legislation, and laws against unfair
trade practices?
During recent years there has been an interesting experiment
to control prices by direct governmental action. While present-
day governments have shown an unwillingness to grant legal au-
thority to producers to control the price of their products, yet
they have, on the other hand, enacted direct legislation and es-
tablished maximum prices to be charged, as in the case of public
utilities, or by other legislation restricted the acts of producers
either singly or in associations from agreeing upon any action
to control prices on the theory that the widest possible play of
competition among producers best conserves the interests of the
public.
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In addition to this effort of the government to regulate price
through control of the producer, interesting experiments have
lately been made by the government itself in an effort to control
the amount of the product which goes to the market, thus limit-
ing the supply and hence favorably affecting the price. These
have been efforts primarily to benefit the producer and not the
consumer, in contrast with what has been the usual attitude of
the government in matters of this kind. The most notable ex-
amples have been in the case of England with its Stevenson Law
in regard to rubber, Brazil in connection with coffee, and most
recently the United States with its Federal Farm Board.
In the case of England and Brazil the control of price was
sought through regulating the supply which was sent to the
market. In the United States, the experiment is more direct,
since control of price is being sought by direct purchase of a
part of the supply. In the case of rubber and coffee the result
has been a failure, largely for tht reason that the very initial
success carried with it promise of failure in that stimulation of
production in other countries as well as in the controlling nation
was encouraged. This was true because the price originally
sought to be established for the producer insured a profit to him
and very naturally made for an increased world supply.
It is too soon to pass final judgment on the experiment in the
United States, but there are certain fundamental economic prin-
ciples which cannot be abrogated by our own or any other
government. First, if the government accumulates by purchase
any considerable supply and thus holds it over the market, un-
certainty is created and prices become unstable, for neither pro-
ducer nor consumer knows when the governmental agency either
will place the supply on the market or will go into the market
and buy. Second, if the producers of any commodity are guar-
anteed by the tax-raising power of their governments a profit on
their product, each will strive to produce as much as possible
and other producers from other fields will be attracted to an
economic activity in which profits are guaranteed. Third, if
there is not, therefore, as part of such a program some plan of
controlling the supply in harmony with the present and prospec-
tive demand for the product, failure is almost certain. If a
country produces a very large supply of a product-that is, if it
has a practical monopoly, and if other nations cannot produce it
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and if there are not any substitutes for the article-then a con-
siderable degree of success might be secured by a plan of govern-
ment-purchasing and price-fixing, provided the price is not so
high as to restrict consumption.
There are, therefore, so many conditions attached to the pos-
sible success of such a program that we have not as yet had' a
successful one. In the present era of international markets
with so many sources of and demand for basic commodities, with
highly developed transportation systems and rapid means of
communication, it will be extremely difficult for any one govern-
ment to very successfully regulate the price of a basic commodity
in our highly sensitive world market. However, governmental
effort to control prices directly has never been very successful
because it is inherently in opposition to the fundamental prin-
ciples underlying privately organized competitive industrial so-
ciety, where each seeks to reap as much profit as possible from a
favorable market.
If little or no success has attached to the efforts of government
to control directly or indirectly the prices of commodities and if
governments have not been willing to grant producers the au-
thority to do so, is there, on the other hand, any hope of stabi-
lizing production and thus indirectly bringing about a greater
stability in the trend of prices which would eliminate the recur-
ring periods of over-supply with the attendant industrial de-
pression? The greatest single economic and social problem con-
fronting the world is that of better co-ordinating production and
consumption. The condition which has brought this need for
stabilization is that there has been such an enormous advance in
scientific discovery, inventions, business organization and the
consequent mechanization of industry that both in the case of
raw commodities and many manufactured articles there is an
enormous surplus producing capacity in the world. There is
this great and keen competition to obtain the market-that is, in
periods of prosperity each producer tries to get to the market as
many units of the commodity as possible during a period of
favorable prices and this leads inevitably to a maladjustment of
the supply and the demand. Then too, this co-ordination of pro-
duction to consumption is also important in connection with the
competition for the control of raw commodities. The solution
of this problem will be extremely difficult, but anything that con-
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tributes to a greater stabilization of production and consequent
reduction in the fluctuation of the price level, together with a
reduction in the risk of bringing about these gluts in the market,
will largely contribute to social and economic welfare. Neither
individually nor collectively over long periods does society gain
through these alternate periods of booms and depressions. What
might be accomplished on a wide scale is indicated in what has
already been done in the case of certain industries where large
units have been formed and exercise a considerable control over
production. However, the law lends no encouragement but
rather discouragement to such a procedure; for combinations,
nationally or internationally, are tabooed by the law.
Any attempt at stabilization of this character in an earlier
period would have been futile: first, because there was not suffi-
cient information on which to base a system of rationalization or
stabilization, and second, because the individual producing units
were too numerous and too small. Now, however, we have avail-
able not only statistics of potential and actual production of the
leading nations and the units therein, but also a wealth of in-
formation regarding annual consumption. These statistics come
not only from various governmental sources but also from trade
associations and private agencies and supply, therefore, a wealth
of information upon which might be based more intelligent ef-
forts to co-ordinate the productive capacity of the world with the
existing consumptive demand. It may be argued that nothing
can be done in this direction and that the automatic forces of
competition must be left to regulate this situation, bringing
about these periods of alternate plenty and scarcity with the con-
comitant losses individually and nationally to millions of people.
Or it may be argued that such a power should not be granted to
individual producers lest they exercise it for their own benefit to
the detriment of the public. This is similar to the argument
which prevailed in an earlier period of railways and public
utilities before supervision and regulation of rates by govern-
ments. No one, however, would argue today that the situation
is not infinitely better under our system of government regula-
tion of railway and public utility rates than in the old days of
cutthroat competition with all of its attendant evils.
The two most important obstacles to bringing about greater
stabilization of production and hence this greater harmony be-
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tween supply of and demand for goods are: first the statutory
laws, especially those in the United States. Our nation was
founded by those who believed thoroughly in the theory of com-
petition, free contract, and private property. The marvelous
and rapid industrial development was believed to result from
the free scope given to private initiative, our natural resources,
and the native ability of our people. We permitted and en-
couraged the freest possible play of individual enterprise, even
when it meant the exploitation and waste of our natural re-
sources. We are still very largely devoted to this philosophy of
unlimited competition and private initiative. Our people are
suspicious of any large business enterprise and are ready to
enact laws and prosecute any association or combination which
seems to restrict competition.
Yet there is little doubt that if there were not these national
and international legal and political barriers, the industrialists
of the nation and the world would bring about a greater measure
of stability in production. Nor would this necessarily be an ef-
fort to control price in a manner to exploit the consumer. This
would be true not because these industrialists would be actuated
by any particular ethical motive to serve the consumer but be-
cause it would be, as the industrialists would maintain, good
business to preserve a market for a product at a fair price and at
a stable price. Producers no more than the consumers are, over
long periods of time, benefited by these alternating periods of
high prices and low prices. Over a series of years a level of
prices, gradually changing as a result of increased consumption
and changes in technological processes is much to be preferred
both for producers and consumers.
The second obstacle to such a plan of stabilizing production is
the strong feeling of nationalism now actuating the people of
most countries. One of the many unfortunate products of the
World War was the reviving of this spirit of nationalism which
had begun somewhat to wane in favor of greater world co-opera-
tion. Nevertheless, there is at present more of a will to co-
operate among industrialists, nationally and internationally,
than is to be found among any other groups. The world is striv-
ing to establish a political League of Nations. An Industrial
League of Nations might more easily be accomplished and carry
with it great promises of good to humanity. But statutory law,
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national and international, does not vision co-operation among
producers and distributors. The only place where any effort is
being made in this direction is in the Soviet Republics and here
it is not a voluntary action, encouraged or permitted by the
Government, but one emanating from a small governing class
and enforced upon both producers and consumers.
Why then do we find this frequent conflict between the law on
the one hand and the industrial and social tendencies on the
other? Why is law so conservative, so static, and the industrial
and social order so radical, so dynamic? Perhaps the chief ex-
planation is to be found in the nature of law. Social experience
has long since demonstrated that a law to be an effective rule of
human conduct must command voluntary obedience by the mem-
bers of the social group. The vast majority of laws are not en-
forced. They do not need to be.
Industrial evolution is always complex and evokes conflict of
interests among individuals and especially between social groups.
Some are always benefited, others are always injured. For ex-
ample, the introduction of the factory system meant the passing
of the system of household industry and brought with it the
problems of child and woman labor, of the sweat shop, long
hours, and other attendant evils. It was, however, a long time
after the introduction of the factory system before public opin-
ion sufficiently solidified to lead to the enactment of factory legis-
lation, governing the hours of labor, employment of women and
children, and sanitary conditions of work. Again railroad legis-
lation in the United States of a simple character began soon after
the development of the railroad, but proceeded not nearly so
rapidly as railway development and had to do in its early period
largely with matters of incorporation. Soon, however, with the
rapidly developing railway system, the problem of competition
and rates became very complex, but this situation continued for
many years before any comprehensive federal legislation was
enacted to regulate interstate commerce.
Finally, in 1887, the Interstate Commerce Act was passed.
The people of the country yet strongly believed in the principle
of the greatest possible competition among the railroads. Mr.
Fink, who at that time was President of the Atlantic Steamship
and Railway Company, pleaded with Congress to permit pooling,
but to Congressmen as well as to the people pooling meant less
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competition and there was no sentiment of any importance
favoring it. Nevertheless, in 1920, Congress passed an act
which encouraged and even commanded the railroads of the
United States to consolidate, thus limiting and even abandoning
the old theory of encouraging and forcing unlimited competition.
It thus took over thirty years for public opinion to comprehend
that unregulated competition among railroads was not inherent-
ly a virtue of our transportation system. Transportation con-
ditions long before 1920 demand greater unification of the
railroad system and indeed it had gone on. But it was chiefly
of the type of end-to-end consolidation rather than that of
parallel and feeder lines. It would have been useless in an
earlier period for any Congressman to suggest that the railways
ought to be permitted to form larger systems and indeed many
cases in the courts give witness to the fact that the temper of
the people would not permit railway consolidations, since con-
solidation to the public meant monopoly.
All these and other examples that might be cited show that
under a competitively organized industrial society and a demo-
cratic and representative government, sensitively responsfve to
the opinion of different social and industrial groups, statutory
law will never keep pace with changing industrial and social con-
ditions. No doubt real injury and loss is entailed on society by
this necessity of waiting until public opinion is formed on these
economic questions before they can be legislated upon. But to
enact laws before voluntary obedience would be given to them
would mean the destruction of all law and social order, for it
must be emphasized again that, under any form of government,
the vast majority of the laws cannot and are not intended to be
enforced.
What can then be done to bring enacted law into greater har-
mony with changing industrial and social conditions? The chief
reliance must be placed, as in so many other difficult problems
which trouble the human race, only in a higher level of intelli-
gence among the people at large. This means in a practical
sense that it is a matter of better educational results from our
schools and colleges. This situation is especially true among
people who have democratic political organizations. If the voter
has the wit and wisdom to elect legislators of intelligence, and
if both the voter and the legislator have the intelligence to com-
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prehend the direction and meaning of the changing industrial
and social order, then old laws will be repealed and new laws will
be passed not only in harmony with the changed condition, but
indeed so as to give direction to the dynamic social and industrial
tendencies.
But alas, the underlying forces operating to produce changes
in industrial society are so complex and deep that they are large-
ly beyond the understanding of the average voter or legislator
until they have fairly well worked themselves out. In purely
social institutions, there is another great difficulty in that the
average man's opinion of what is proper control of social conduct
is very largely a matter of tradition and inheritance. That is
to state, a man's idea of the family, of religion, and other basic
social institutions is a result of inherited ideas, unconsciously
and non-intellectually acquired. He believes about the social
order. He learns and knows about the industrial order. For
that reason, the social order is much more stable than the in-
dustrial. For this reason laws enacted on social matters, passed
in times of temporary excitement or under the leadership of
demagogues, are the greatest possible failures.
The educational institution to which we must look for relief is
largely social in its origin and characteristics. It has, there-
fore, all the inhibitions which make it slowly responsive to the
changing industrial and social conditions and it thus ill prepares
the student to understand the industrial, social, and political
world and to aid him in devising rules-that is, laws-to govern
and direct it.
Progress, whatever that may mean, is painfully slow and
achieving it, so far as it ever is achieved, depends largely upon
mass ideas and movement. It is only when an idea or a plan
wins the support, intellectual or instinctive, of large numbers,
that it acquires a momentum and force that makes it effective
as a factor in improving the social and political order. The
futility of political reforms has been illustrated time and again.
Unless the reformers have ideas and plans which secure the per-
manent support of the people it is but so much misdirected
human effort. The numerous reform campaigns in American
cities give ample evidence of this statement, for political uncon-
sciousness seems to be the normal state of the average American.
His business, his pleasure, and his purely personal affairs are so
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much more worth while in commanding his real interest. But,
doubtless, the American is no different from the European or
even the people of other times. Pericles was under the necessity
from time to time of going down to the agora and, assuming the
role of a demagogue, appealing to the emotions of the citizens of
Athens in order to win support for his plans to wisely govern
Athens. There is an enormous amount of static in the social
and political order. Industrial society is more dynamic. The
reason is not only that there has been a freer play of intellect
and reason in the industrial order than in the others, but also
that the permanent and personal benefits and gains of being a
skeptic and intellectualist in the industrial order are much
greater and are usually enjoyed by the individual who has the
original thought. If you want to be a Thomas A. Edison or a
Henry Ford there is not only no objection or bar to it, but you
will probably reap real and personal rewards. But if you insist
on being a John Huss or a Christ you will probably be burned at
the stake or be crucified.
Hence, we cannot expect that law will be prospective as re-
gards the industrial order and much less so as regards the social
order. We can but repeat that enacted law and its interpreta-
tion by the judiciary should be a rule of conduct upon which the
vast majority of the social group has already agreed. Very
properly, the courts should lay great store on the old musty legal
tomes and precedent. It is wise for the lawyer and good for
society for him to be continually prating about the wisdom of the
fathers and the founders of the nation.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol16/iss3/2
